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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 














                                             Appellant  
__________ 
 
Present: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, AMBRO, FUENTES, 
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, 
VANASKIE, and KRAUSE, and NYGAARD*, Circuit Judges 
 
  
 The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above-entitled case having been 
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other 
available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who 
concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the  
circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the  
 






*Pursuant to Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.5.3., Judge Nygaard’s vote is limited to panel 
rehearing.
  Judges Rendell, Ambro, Greenaway, and Vanaskie would have granted the  
 
petition for rehearing en banc. 
   




s/ Michael A. Chagares 
Circuit Judge 
Dated: December 31, 2014 
CJG/cc: David R. Fine, Esq. 
  Jeffrey M. Brandt, Esq. 
  Norman Gross, Esq. 



















OPINION SUR REHEARING 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, 
Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. 
 
Christopher Erwin pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent 
to distribute oxycodone.  As a part of his plea agreement, he waived most (but not all) of 
the arguments he otherwise could have raised on appeal.  He filed an appeal containing 
only a waived argument.  Because the argument was waived, the sentence should be 
affirmed.  End of case.  But the panel opinion is longer than the four sentences it took me 
to reach the correct result, as it did not affirm Erwin’s sentence but vacated it to allow the 
Government to seek a longer prison term.  Thus I explain my disagreement. 
This case involves three common concessions of a plea bargain, two by Erwin and 
one by the Government.  Erwin waived his right to appeal his sentence if it fell within or 
below the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation (240 months’ 
incarceration), and he agreed to cooperate with the Government in its investigation of 
Erwin’s criminal associates.  For its part, the Government promised to seek a “downward 
departure” from the Guidelines’ calculation to recognize Erwin’s cooperation.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  Before sentencing, Erwin complied with his promise to cooperate, and 
at his sentencing the Government kept its promise and sought a five-level downward 
departure, resulting in a Guidelines sentence of 151–188 months’ imprisonment.  Erwin 
was sentenced to 188 months, and he appealed. 
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As 188 is less than 240, the only argument Erwin can raise on appeal is that 
affirming his sentence “would work a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Khattak, 
273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).  Artfully cloaked in Khattak’s garb, Erwin raises the 
waived argument that the District Court erred by departing downward from offense level 
39 rather than level 38 (which would have led to a sentencing range of 135–168 months).  
We must therefore ask what do we do with a waived argument. 
The panel wrongly calls this a “novel question.”  United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 
219, 223 (3d Cir. 2014).  When a civil litigant, the Government as prosecutor, or a 
criminal defendant waives an argument, the remedy is to enforce the waiver by not 
considering the argument, even if it has merit.  Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298–99 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d 416, 418 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Hoffecker, 530 
F.3d 137, 163 (3d Cir. 2008). 
From its premise that there is something unusual in a waived argument before the 
Court, the panel reaches the conclusion that it needs to do more than enforce the waiver 
and affirm the sentence.  Here is the novelty: the District Court may now resentence 
Erwin without the Government reprising its downward-departure motion, potentially 
increasing his time in prison by over four years.  The opinion relies on statements from 
contract law, but, on closer examination, contract principles faithfully applied call for a 
different remedy from the one our Court orders. 
The panel presents a false choice between “de novo resentencing” and 
“withdrawal of the plea” as the appropriate remedies for breach of a plea waiver.  Erwin, 
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765 F.3d at 231.  But the cases it relies on in presenting these unhappy alternatives all 
involved presentence breaches that relieved the nonbreaching party of as-yet unfulfilled 
promises in order to restore the parties to the status quo before the breach.  Here the 
Government (the nonbreaching party) fulfilled its promise by seeking a downward 
departure from the Guidelines’ sentencing range; later, Erwin breached by appealing.  To 
restore the parties to their pre-breach positions, we need only nullify Erwin’s appeal.  To 
do this, we should not consider Erwin’s arguments, no matter how meritorious.   
Rejecting this approach, the panel created the new rule that a “defendant must 
accept the risk that . . . enforcing the waiver may not be the only consequence” of an 
appeal.  Id. at 236.  Unlike traditional contract remedies, any consequence that goes 
beyond enforcing the waiver gives the Government more than it bargained for.  
Specifically, it bargained for Erwin’s cooperation (which it got) and his waiver of the 
argument that his sentence was calculated incorrectly.  We have held that the 
Government receives “the full benefit of its bargain” when it files “a motion for summary 
action under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 to enforce the waiver and to dismiss the appeal.” 
United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 535 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).1  Now the Government 
gets more than the full benefit of its bargain, namely, an opportunity to sentence Erwin 
again without an obligation to compensate him for his cooperation. 
                                              
1 For technical reasons not relevant to this case, Goodson should have said “affirm the 
judgment of the district court” instead of “dismiss the appeal.”  United States v. Gwinnett, 
483 F.3d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 2007).  Nonetheless the substance of Goodson remains true: 
the Government gets the benefit of its bargain when we dispose of appeals under L.A.R. 
27.4 without briefing and argument before a merits panel. 
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The panel provides no sound reason for its new remedy, and I join the growing 
chorus of commentators who have lamented this decision.  See Kevin Bennardo, United 
States v. Erwin and the Folly of Intertwined Cooperation and Plea Agreements, 71 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. Online 160 (2014); Alain Leibman, “Third Circuit Holds that Breach of 
Agreement not to Appeal Justifies Government’s Withdrawal of 5K Motion,” White 
Collar Defense and Compliance (Sept. 18, 2014), available at http://whitecollarcrime. 
foxrothschild.com/2014/09/articles/sentencing-1/third-circuit-holds-that-breach-of-
agreement-not-to-appeal-justifies-governments-withdrawal-of-5k-motion/ (“Not only did 
the court get it wrong in terms of appreciating the true nature of the parties’ exchange of 
commitments, but it did not even apply contracts law correctly.”); Matthew Stiegler, 
“Divided Court Denies En Banc Rehearing in Erwin Appeal-Waiver Case,” CA3blog 
(December 31, 2014), available at http://thirdcircuitblog.com/cases/divided-court-denies-
en-banc-rehearing-in-erwin-appeal-waiver-case/ (“An ignominious ending to 2014.”); 
Lathrop B. Nelson, III, “Third Circuit Issues Cautionary Tale for Appellate Waivers,” 
White Collar Alert (Aug. 24, 2014), available at http://whitecollarblog.mmwr.com/ 
2014/08/27/third-circuit-issues-cautionary-tale-for-appellate-waivers/ (“What about those 
defendants who have legitimate appellate issues that decline to appeal for fear of a 
harsher sentence if the court deems the appeal within the scope of their appellate 
waiver?”); Hon. Richard George Kopf, “Pigs Get Fed, Hogs Get Slaughtered,” Hercules 
and the Umpire (Sept. 2, 2014), available at http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2014/09/ 
02/pigs-get-fed-hogs-get-slaughered/ (“Contract principles are not intended to be 
punitive, and more than four years extra in prison appears to be punitive rather than 
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restorative in nature.”); Scott H. Greenfield, “Such a Deal (or Snitches Get Stiches),” 
Simple Justice (Sept. 8, 2014), available at http://blog.simplejustice.us/2014/09/08/such-
a-deal/ (“Nobody would have seen this coming.”).  
In every one of the thousands of criminal appeals this Court has heard since the 
first appellate waiver in a plea bargain, we have never before held that an attempt to 
litigate a waived argument opens the door to a harsher sentence.  Yet here we do.  This 
cuts counter to how we have acted, and it goes against the majority of cases in other 
circuits.  E.g., United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 
886, 894 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc); but see United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th 
Cir. 2001).2  We should remain faithful to our long-time practice of treating waived 
arguments in plea agreements the same as in other contexts.  
* * * * * 
For these reasons, I dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. 
                                              
2 Hare assumes that resentencing those who raise waived arguments benefits defendants 
as a class because it makes “promises [not to appeal] credible,” and it holds that dismissal 
of the appeal is an “incomplete [remedy] . . . because the prosecutorial resources are 
down the drain.”  269 F.3d at 861.  But Hare fails to consider that: appeals cannot be 
completely waived, Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563; ignoring a possibly meritorious argument 
is a significant sanction; and the Government can limit its outlay of resources “through a 
routine motion to strike,” United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Wood, J. concurring), or for summary affirmance.  I therefore find Hare unpersuasive. 
 
